Is Surpassing Sectarianism Possible? / 27.11.2009
I think that we have not payed attention and we could not pay attention to the nature of religious feelings and the historical residues in every sect [or denomination] itself. So, in order to facilitate the political cogitation we have considered that there is one such entity called a sect, and we have perceived this entity abstractly or juristically in order to surpass it in the state system. Michel Shiha came to draw up the constitution and to consider the sects [or denominations] as if they were identical. He considered particularly the minorities and sought their freedom in the inventories of the Ottoman past. He thought that a fair balance provides their participation in the state without underestimating any one’s right. However, Shiha did not differentiate between Islam and Christianity in nature. He differentiated in his perception of the societal existence. In Christianity, he did not distinguish between the Maronites and other Christians, or between the Orthodox view of historical Islam and the Maronite view of it.
What I am proposing here is that the abolition of political sectarianism is not enough in order to surpass the sect and move toward that which is beyond it, and which is more firm and constant, namely toward the national state or the nationality. I presume that the nature of national thought is founded upon one’s ability to overcome the sectarian affiliation through national partisan education and cultural values, hence move to a different wider affiliation. This thought follows a western pattern, which was not complicated. For example, after the French Revolution, the people discovered that they were a nation. There was the crust of the united regality with the Catholic Church, which has distanced them from the notion of the nation. Though they were truly a nation, only the veil should have been removed. In our case, however, the nation has to be founded, since we have not yet been a nation.
We have come from the Islamic civilization and from the Maronites’ perception of their own and of the others’ existence. When we hear the Muslim Imams or the Islamist [Muslim] thinkers referring to the nation, they have the Sacred Text in their background: “You were the best nation brought forth to mankind, bidding the right and forbidding the wrong” (Sura Al-῾Imran [The Family of ῾Imran], 110), and this has nothing to do with the notion of a nation in its national sense. Islam is not merely about a spiritual vision. Islam is also about the worldly reality, and the world means politics. I do not say that national conviction is necessary for political unification. Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not unite because of their nationality, but because of the state-organization containing several ethnicities. Thus, it is possible to seek only the state in Lebanon. And it is not true that in reality we are statelets. Islam is a worldly and an otherworldly entity at the same time, and it is not a statelet, regardless whether it insists to maintain its personal status. And it does not seem that anyone in Lebanon is ready to surpass the personal status.
In the political movement of the Maronites, and in the depth of their conscience, they have a reading of their own reality and of Lebanon which differs significantly from the reading of Lebanese Islam of itself. In their historical suppression and in their taking refuge on the mountain, the Maronites formed a people in its full sense. And there is nothing in the national unification which hinders the existence of several ethnicities as it is in Belgium and Switzerland. Today, it does not seem that the [Maronite] ethnicity insists on its precedence in the state. Though Islam has no national utterance, nevertheless, its conscience resides in antecedence, since it considers itself the final and the full revelation. However this does not make it an ethnicity, in the contemporary political movement. Maronites, though belonging to Catholicism, which is about unmoving doctrine, nevertheless on the political level Catholicism has begun to discover, albeit slowly, nationalism. The Catholic Church, whenever compared to the Russian and the Greek Orthodoxy [of Greece] with their intense nationality, has started to move toward nationality in all its countries. How could both Muslims and Maronites, as each group is an entity, move toward a state [reality], which is for all people? And how could they admit to all people equal rights, so that they might abolish any feeling of superiority or precedence or historical arrogance or the historical projection of the greatness of [their] faith?
Armenians are a unique phenomenon, since they are of a true nationality in their conscience and of true patriotism toward Lebanon. And this is possible theoretically and practically. They are nationalists, and this is not of the nature of their Christian faith since this does not involve nationalism, but because of their history, since they are proud of being the first Christian state in history. To recent times their literary heritage was of Christian inspiration. In my view the Armenians’ belonging to Lebanon is intact since there is no conflict between their national pride and their loyalty to the Lebanese state.
The Greek Orthodox hardly embark upon the state offices, and it does not seem that they have a noticeable move in it. What distinguishes them from Muslims is that their Eastern Christianity has no say in politics, in its real sense, maybe because their faith does not involve nationality. And maybe their being free of nationality has induced them to join a non-national trend. This deprivation of nationality reveals to me that the Lebanese Orthodox or the Arabs yield to secularism, perhaps because of their complete adhesion to a Church in which they do not perceive any sectarian partisanship. And you find them united on spiritual level, maybe because they are free of tribalism. This leads me to say that they, as a model, present the nearest image for merger into the state. Thus, the one who does not aspire for mini-state presence would not aspire for a personal role in the greater state.
It is no more sufficient to say with Michel Shiha that the sectarian system involves justice or approaches justice. This has not succeeded since the affiliation to a sect was not merely an affiliation to a statelet; rather it was an ideology entrenched in the souls and deeper than the political indication. All who consider these issues among us believe that the solution of the problem is in transferring one’s affiliation from a statelet to a greater state. But how? I know that breaking the sectarian strap by the law, namely the abolishing of sectarian politics, would have a significant impact. Nevertheless, the mere advocacy to contend against sectarianism within the souls would pave the way for abolishing the texts. This assumes that the citizen’s attachment to his/[her] sect [or denomination] does not follow one pattern. We have shown four patterns where feelings, incentives and concerns are different, and there are sects [or denominations] which we have left out.
Here I ask the Muslims, and particularly the Sunnis, whether they consider their liberation from the world, being a component of Islam, as desirable, as the future of Islam in Europe seems to be (Of course there is as well secular Islam). Would they efface the perception of the world as divided to believers [the Muslims] and Christians, who are infidels, and Jews, since they all are citizens? I do not ask the Maronites, since I understand their pains. However I invite them to take their Catholicism seriously in its acceptance of all segments of the society equally.
I do not ask the Armenians or the Greek Orthodox anything since I know that they belong completely to the state. The growth of these two communities in their spiritual and cultural depth is a guarantee of their consolidation in the homeland as equal with all.
What I have attempted to show briefly is that we do not have the same difficulties which distance us from merging into the nation, and the intellectuals have to address that distancing [of the communities from the nation] in its depth. Diversity does not necessarily mean cultural richness. In our case it would sometimes mean separation, since the intellectual and the sentimental unity is not available. Each of our religious segments has its own levels by which it moves toward the state.
This does not mean that I do not appreciate greatly the cultural, societal and political activity, which breaks through the existing barriers between some sects [or denominations] and the state, in terms of theory. I know that some of the Muslims and the Maronites have given up the residues of history and sometimes some of theology. However, I say to the seculars and the nationalists that the issue is not only to break the barriers of the sects [or the denominations], but to address their errors and ills from inside. Lebanese nationality might rise, though superficially, by the abolishing of the sectarian politics. However, it will not take root until after the spiritual and the historical criticism of the sects [or the denominations] be done by the sects themselves.
Translated by Sylvie Avakian-Maamarbashi
Original Text: “هل من تجاوز للطائفية؟” –An Nahar- 27.11.2009
Continue reading